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Abstract 
This paper is a theoretical investigation that sets forth a scientific debate on the concepts of organization, economic organization, 
and stabilizer from the perspective of complex systems. By defining these concepts, the paper aims at increasing the intelligibility 
of social and economic phenomena. In formulating the definitions, we considered the following criteria: the adequacy criterion, 
the consistency criterion and the independence criterion. The paper is part of a larger study on the economic organization and the 
paradigm of the living logical system. 
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1. Introduction: the significance of scientific concepts 
The significance of scientific concepts is essential, as it is one of the cornerstones of the whole edifice of human 
knowledge. When we refer to knowledge, we have in mind either the mechanism by virtue of which our knowledge 
is produced, or the result of this approach, framed into concepts or theories [Flonta, 2008, p. 95]. 
In the evolution of philosophical thinking, we find that there has been an intense focus on the issue of knowledge, 
approached from the two above-mentioned viewpoints. The concern for the sources of knowledge goes back to the 
antiquity, when philosophers like Plato, Aristotle and Democritus perceived knowledge through the lenses of the 
intellect, regarding the senses as being changeable and therefore unable to express reality. In their opinion, reality 
can be penetrated only by means of the intellect, which is capable of discovering the true nature of things. 
Alongside the ancient philosophers, rationalists like Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz were concerned primarily 
with the first aspect of knowledge, namely the modalities involved in the production of knowledge. According to the 
rationalist line of argument, it is the intellect, by no means helped by the senses, that is the source of knowledge. In 
other words, the advocates of the rationalist thesis share the same belief about knowledge, namely that it is rooted in 
reason, which is dissociated from the senses. 
Empiricists like Hume and Locke revolved primarily around the second aspect of knowledge, specifically around 
the effect of the mechanism by which knowledge is produced and around concepts and theories. Their belief was 
that any apprehension of reality must be organized into a system of concepts and that sensory information is the 
source of all awareness of reality. The upholders of the empiricist theory of concepts argue that only concepts 
derived from sensory impressions have cognitive significance. 
Hume found that, by means of the senses, we cannot acquire concepts that we regard as essential, such as the 
concept of causal connection. Hume’s message that “the sensory raw material, the only source of our knowledge, 
through habit may lead us to faith and expectation but not to the knowledge and still less to the understanding of 
lawful relations” was quite clear, but also quite crushing [Einstein, 2010, p.86]. 
Subsequently, Kant set forth a new approach to knowledge, stating that it has two sources: the first source is our 
ability to receive representations (the receptivity of impressions), while the second source is our ability to become 
aware of an object by means of these representations (the spontaneity of concepts) [Kant, 2009, p.95]. By means of 
the former, objects are presented to us, and, by virtue of the latter, they are conceived in relation to those 
representations. According to Kant, intuition and concepts are undoubtedly the elements of all our knowledge, both 
being either pure or empirical. They are empirical when they contain sensation (which implies the presence of the 
object), and pure, when no sensation is involved in the representation (which does not imply the presence of the 
object). Empirical intuition and concepts are possible a posteriori, while pure intuition and concepts are formed a 
priori. 
In his work Remarks on Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Knowledge, Einstein [Einstein, 2010, p.83-88] reflects on 
the evolution of philosophical thinking over the centuries and concludes that a major role was played by the 
following problem: What kind of knowledge can pure thinking provide irrespective of sensory impressions? Is there 
such knowledge? And if there is not, where does our knowledge stand in relation to the material provided by the 
senses? 
As far as these questions are concerned, Einstein points out that Kant was right when he maintained that we make 
use of thinking, of concepts that cannot be reached by virtue of the material provided by the sensory experience, if 
we consider the situation from a logical point of view. Kant stated that all concepts which arise in our thought and in 
our linguistic expressions are all – when viewed logically – the free creations of thought which cannot inductively 
be gained from sense experiences. This is not so easily noticed only because we have the habit of combining certain 
concepts and conceptual relations (propositions) so definitely with certain sense experiences that we do not become 
conscious of the gulf – logically unbridgeable – which separates the world of sensory experiences from the world of 
concepts and propositions. 
Einstein argues against the idea that concepts (either common thinking concepts or scientific ones) could be 
derived from sensations and insists that sensations and concepts are essentially different entities, which cannot be 
derived from one another. As a matter of fact, Popper’s critique of the fact that general concepts and statements can 
be derived from sensory impressions and from statements about particular facts relied primarily on evolutionary 
biology, and endorsed, with the increasing detachment characteristic of creative minds, the assumption that there is a 
542   Vasile Brătian /  Procedia Economics and Finance  16 ( 2014 )  540 – 547 
logical correlation between sensory impressions and concepts, between particular observations, on the one hand, and 
laws and theories, on the other hand [Flonta, 2008, p. 121]. 
 
2. Complex systems 
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Complexity is a feature of reality that involves a non-linear approach to its study. The theories and models based 
on this non-linear approach to reality were formed into a new science, today known as the Science of Complexity, a 
science that can be assimilated only insofar as the properties and specificity of a complex system are perceived, and 
that should not to be confused with the main models, theories and techniques of measurement that it uses (the 
bifurcation theory, the network theory, the catastrophe theory, the deterministic chaos theory, fractal geometry, 
synergetics, etc. [Broche, Marinescu, coordinators, 2008, p. 27 - 31]). 
The beginnings of the science of complex systems were traced by Prigogine as going back to 1811, the year when 
Jean-Joseph Fourier won the Academy Prize for his theoretical discussion of the propagation of heat in solid bodies. 
This moment marked a turning point in physics, as mathematical physics and Newtonian mechanics ceased to be 
synonymous. As a result, starting with this moment, a new theory of physics, mathematically as rigorous as the 
mechanical laws of motion and quite different from Newtonian physics, began to take shape [Prigogine, p. 152]. 
In thermodynamics, the theory of dissipative structures, formulated by Prigogine in the terms of non-linear 
dynamics, managed to explain not only the spontaneous emergence of order, but was also chiefly helpful in defining 
complexity. Hence, if previous to this theory the study of complexity referred chiefly to the study of complex 
systems, the researchers’ attention subsequently turned from structures to emergence processes [Capra, p. 36]. 
Moreover, the new theory revealed that Boltzmann’s order principle no longer applied to these structures. 
Complex systems are systems that cannot be predicted, that have a nonlinear evolution which depends on the 
whole, on the overall condition, and cannot be analyzed using the mechanistic methodology that involves the 
superposition principle. This principle tells us that if the variables that describe the properties of a system change 
over time, then this change is directly proportional to the change in the state of the system in that time unit. 
According to Kauffman, “the complex whole may exhibit properties that are not readily explained by 
understanding its parts. The complex whole, in a completely non-statistical sense, can often exhibit collective 
properties, ‘emergent’ features that are lawful in their own right” [Kauffman, 1993, apud Broche, 2008, p.28]. In a 
similar vein, we find that complex systems, treated in a completely non-statistical manner, may exhibit emergent 
properties. This is due to the failure of such systems to observe Boltzmann’s order principle. This implies that the 
most likely accessible state of a system arises when the plurality of events occurring simultaneously in the system 
statistically compensates for their effects. 
A logical approach to economic phenomena from the perspective of complex systems is adopted by Dinga, who 
proposes a scientific debate on the concept of “the living logical system”, with the following necessary predicates: it 
is a system; it is dissipative; it is nonlinear; it has autopoietic capacity; and the total complexity is invariant [Dinga , 
2009, p. 378-380]. 
To sum up, complex systems can be narrowed down to the following features [see also Broche, Marinescu, 
coordinators, 2008, p. 29]: 
x Complex systems cannot be comprehended by means of reductionism, i.e. by splitting the whole into component 
parts and adding them up, as they are made up of elements that make sense only within the integrity of the 
system; 
x Complex systems evolve unpredictably (except for a short period of time called ‘time horizon’); 
x Complex systems can undergo sudden changes in state (bifurcations); 
x Complex systems have different aspects depending on the scale of analysis; 
x Complex systems do not comply with the superposition principle and their evolution is therefore unpredictable; 
x Complex systems are sensitive to initial conditions (slightly different initial conditions lead to very different 
developments); 
x Complex systems have autopoietic (self-organizing) capacity and do not observe Boltzmann’s order principle; 
x Complex systems can be modelled and studied in an equivalent topological space called ‘phase space’, which has 
its specific concepts: attractors and repulsors, attraction basin , trajectories, limit cycles, etc.; 
x Complex systems are characterized by evolution and dynamics, but these are two separate issues requiring 
specific approaches. 
3. The concepts of organization and economic organization 
The notion of organization has not been, as yet, unified defined. According to the various authors organization 
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has a very differing meaning. Two conceptions of organization are characteristic of the classical theory of 
organization, above all, namely the organic and the mechanistic conception of organization [Ivanko, 2013]. The 
1960Ąs work of Tom Burns and George Stalker had much impact in the field of organization theory, with their 
study of innovation, management, and structure of Scottish electronics firms. In their writing on mechanistic and 
organic structures, they outlined the differences between the two types and solidified the concept in the minds of 
future generations of organizational theorists and business scholars. Burns and Stalker claimed “a mechanistic 
management system is appropriate to stable conditions” whereas an “organismic form is appropriate to changing 
conditions, which give rise constantly to fresh problems and unforeseen requirements for action which cannot be 
broken down or distributed automatically arising from the functional roles defined with a hierarchic structure.” 
The followers of the organic (biologist) theory of organization compare the organization with a live organism. 
Their opinion is that organization should be built after the pattern of a live organism, there should be build in 
organization  also all those regulatory mechanisms that can be found in each live human being. The followers of the 
mechanistic concept of organization, on the other hand, treat organization as something similar to a mechanism, 
having the general characteristic of a complete machine. Such a device must work without friction, without errors 
caused by human weaknesses; such a device should be, as a rule, superior to man. 
In the following, we define the concepts of organization and economic organization according to appropriateness, 
consistency and independence criteria. In other words, we define the economic organization by establishing 
sufficient predicates.  
Firstly, in accordance with specialist literature developments, we believe that the genus proximus of the 
economic organization is the organization. In our opinion, the organization is generated by concurrently checking 
three sufficient predicates [Brătian, 2012, p. 14-21]: 
1.It is an institutional system (by ‘institutional system’ we suggest that it has a membrane that separates it from 
the environment in which it exists, and this membrane is of the institutional type); 
2.The relations between the component parts within the membrane are non-market relations; 
3.The system has its own endogenous aim (by ‘endogenous aim’ we suggest that it is established from within the 
membrane of the system, which is distinct from the aims of component parts); 
4.At least one of the components is a cultural subject. 
We can see that sufficient predicates are independent from and consistent with one another, and that these 
predicates (which are obviously also necessary predicates) generate, once they have been verified, new necessary 
predicates. 
The necessary character of sufficient predicates is given by the fact that, in our observable universe, from an 
empirical point of view (i.e. our intersubjectively communicable experience), there are entities that verify the 
sufficient predicates. 
We determine the generating of new necessary predicates with the help of combinatorial analysis and reflection. In 
other words, we calculate the sum of possible combinations of sufficient predicates 
 ¦ knC  , and based on these 





nC kn                                                              (1) 
 
Hence, we assume that there is a single new necessary predicate, namely the autonomy (this new necessary 
predicate is acknowledged from a legal point of view). 
The logical method used in generating this new necessary predicate can be described as follows: 
The endogenous aim of the system o Autonomy 
That being said, we believe that we can conclude on the definition of the organization as a phenomenological 
attribute, as follows: the organization is an institutional system within whose membrane there is at least one cultural 
subject, between whose components there are non-market relations, which it has its own endogenous aim and 
autonomy. 
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Before defining the economic organization, we must also clarify at least two concepts used in defining the 
organization, i.e.:  
x the concept of non-market relations;  
x the concept of cultural subject. 
x the concept of non-market relations  
In order to explain what we mean by the concept of non-market relations, it is first necessary to specify what we 
mean by the concept of market relations.  
In our opinion, the concept of market relations refers to those communication relations having the following 
sufficient predicates: 
1. Communication is a two-way process (by ‘two-way communication’ we mean the mutual transfer of ideas, 
feelings, etc., between the subjects);  
2. Communication is interconnected (by ‘interconnected communication’ we mean the situation in which the two 
ways of the communication process mutually determine each other);  
3. Communication involves marginal equivalence (by ‘marginal equivalence’ we mean the levelling of marginal 
utilities of the subjects involved in the communication process). 
We can notice that sufficient predicates are independent and consistent with one another and are obviously 
necessary predicates.  
Having said that, we believe that we can conclude on market relations as a phenomenological expression, as 
follows: market relations are interconnected two-way communication relations involving marginal equivalence.  
As a result, the concept of non-market relation refers to those relations that are not market relations as defined 
above.  
From a logical standpoint, for market relations to acquire the expression of non-market relations, it is necessary 
that at least one sufficient predicate out of the multitude of the above-mentioned sufficient predicates should be its 
opposite. 
x The cultural subject 
In our opinion, a cultural subject is characterized by the following sufficient predicates:  
   1. It is a living system (here we refer to carbon-based living systems; nevertheless, in the universe, there 
may be other life forms that are not carbon based);  
   2. It is endowed with awareness (by awareness we mean the ability of a subject to perceive itself and its 
surroundings. To put it differently, a subject that is endowed with awareness is capable of detecting 
otherness [Dinga, 2012]). 
We can see that the above-mentioned sufficient predicates are independent from and consistent with one another 
and are obviously necessary predicates. Once verified, the above-mentioned sufficient predicates generate new 
necessary predicates.  
We believe that there is a single new necessary predicate, i.e.:  
It is capable of forming representations (the subject’s reflection may take two forms: perception, which involves 
the presence of the reflected object, and representation, which does not require the presence of the reflected object). 
The logical method used in generating the new necessary predicate can be described as follows: 
Awareness o  Representation 
We should point out that the generating of a representation by virtue of awareness is ontological rather logical, 
since a subject endowed with awareness presupposes representation. From a logical standpoint, representation 
(necessarily) involves awareness. To put it differently, from an ontological angle, a subject endowed with awareness 
is capable of forming representations; however, from a logical standpoint, a subject that is capable of forming 
representations is endowed with awareness.  
That being said, we believe that we can conclude on the cultural subject as a phenomenological expression, as 
follows: the cultural subject is a living system endowed with awareness and capable of forming representations. 
Yet we consider it necessary to make several remarks on a key species of representation related to the cultural 
subject, namely aim. We consider ‘aim’ to be a kind of representation associated with intentionality. In other words, 
a cultural subject is cable of forming representations that take the shape of intentionality and that acquire the 
expression of aim. We refer to intentionality in the sense given to it by Husserl [Hügli, Lübcke, 2003, p. 50-68]. 
Phenomenologists point out that life experiences are not mere experiences, but experiences of something. All 
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experiences are characterized by the fact that they are awareness of something and are channelled towards 
something. Husserl calls this guided character typical of experiences intentionality, that is something towards which 
awareness (intentum) is channelled and the awareness of something (intentio).  
We outline several crucial features of intentionality:  
x It involves awareness and the apprehended object; 
x The object of intentionality is not relevant - intentionality exists even if the object of my reporting is 
non-existent;  
x Awareness and the apprehended object are not separate experiences;  
x Intentionality has cultural, not instinctual, origin. 
 In the following, in order to formulate the definition of the economic organization, we try to identify the 
sufficient predicates of this species, and then we investigate whether or not they generate new necessary predicates.  
We think that the economic organization is generated by the concurrent checking of two sufficient predicates 
[Brătian, 2012, p. 21-22]: 
1. It is an organization (here we obviously refer to the sense given above);  
2. The connections to its environment are exclusively market relations (we iterate the idea that market relations 
are those interconnected two-way communication relations that involve marginal equivalence). 
Consequently, we believe that we can conclude on the definition of the economic organization as a 
phenomenological attribute, as follows: the economic organization is an organization that forms with its 
environment connections that are exclusively market relations. 
    
4. The concepts of stabilizer 
 
The social and economic fields have placed and will continue to place increasing emphasis on finding stable 
evolution strategies. We believe that the existence of the stabilizer implies the stability of complex systems. In other 
words, in the case of complex systems, what is crucial is reducing uncertainty about the future, rather than 
predicting it. 
By ‘stabilizer’ we mean the concurrent observance of four sufficient predicates [Brătian, 2014]:  
1. It is a tool taking the shape of a device (a set of interrelated components so as to fulfil a function) of the 
institutional type (i.e. having mandatory, legal character) by means of which change is managed (here we consider 
Aristotle’s three types of change: change of place, change of quantity, change of quality);  
2. Its actions aim at reducing the gap between the actual change and the desired change (by ‘desired change’ we 
mean the necessary logical change);  
3. Its actions are opposed to change;  
4. Its actions are oversized in relation to change. 
As a result, we believe that we can conclude on the definition of the stabilizer, as phenomenological attribute, as 
follows: the stabilizer is a tool in the form of a device of institutional type (normative) ) by means of which change 
is managed, its action aims at reducing the gap between the actual change and the desired change; this is opposed to 
change and is oversized in relation to change. 
 
5. Conclusions and remarks 
 
x The organization is an institutional system within whose membrane there is at least one cultural subject. 
There are non-market relations between its components, and it has its own endogenous aim and autonomy; 
x The cultural subject is a living system endowed with awareness and cable of forming representations; 
x Market relations are interconnected two-way communication relations that involve marginal equivalence; 
x Non-market relations are those relations that are not market relations as defined above; 
x The economic organization is an organization that forms with its environment connections that are 
exclusively market relations; 
x The stabilizer is a tool in the form of a device of institutional type (normative) by means of which change is 
managed, its action aims at reducing the gap between the actual change and the desired change; this is opposed to 
change and is oversized in relation to change. 
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